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Abstract: This article analyses the contemporary re-emergence of various and complex 
political claims founded on sovereignty (“sovereigntism”). After discussing five historical 
stages in the evolution of sovereigntism, it highlights three structuring features of the 
post-bipolar international system namely, a growing discrepancy between the affirmation 
of sovereign equality as a norm and its flawed empirical reality, the perpetuation of an 
institutionalised hierarchy that no longer reflects the international distribution of power, and 
the disruption provoked by globalisation, which enables marginalised actors to voice their 
concerns while provoking resistances on the part of others who feel threatened in their status 
and identity. Three distinct conceptions of sovereigntism coexist as a result of these three 
structuring features: ‘neo-sovereigntism’ (claiming the implementation of sovereign equality 
and protesting the rigidity of the international architecture), conservative sovereigntism 
(seeking to preserve the international architecture by redefining sovereignty on normative 
grounds), and archeo-sovereigntism (radically opposing the transnational dynamics of 
globalisation and picturing them as a threat). The encounter of these three incompatible 
conceptions of sovereignty, it is argued, is a relevant variable for explaining contemporary 
disorders.
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INTRODUCTION
Sovereignty, a central concept in the history of political ideas, forms the frontier between 
international relations (the realm of the interactions between sovereign actors) and 
political theory (which deals more with internal sovereignty, its justifications and its 
expressions). Hence, discussions on the nature and the transformations of sovereignty 
pertain to both disciplines. While the concept of sovereignty was formulated by Jean 
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Bodin as “the absolute and perpetual power of a Republic”1, it was later revisited by 
Hugo Grotius who questioned its indivisible nature2. A considerable literature3 has 
explored various aspects of sovereignty including its ante-Westphalian origins and 
post-Westphalian generalisation, its systemic impact, its different understandings and 
contestations4, its ambiguous universalisation through the decolonisation process5 or 
its subsequent political and theoretical hegemony. While it is not the purpose of this 
paper to discuss these different approaches, their abundance raises a primary remark. 
It would be a hard task to identify a concept that has had such influence while being 
so extensively questioned that there is no consensus on its very nature. Sovereignty 
is indeed widely regarded as a “political fiction”6, a “social construct”7 or even an 
“organised hypocrisy”8. Yet, its establishment as the cornerstone of the international 
system has provided it with enormous historical and systemic weight.
This apparent incongruity is a consequence of sovereignty’s multiple status. In 
this paper we will consider it first as a theoretical construct elaborated by lawyers, 
second, as the conventional corner stone of the international system, and third, as the 
object of a systematised political claim. As a theoretical concept, sovereignty shapes 
the articulation between the national and international orders. As the cornerstone of 
the international system, it regulates the relationships between political units in the 
international system9. Finally, as a political claim (sovereigntism or souverainisme), 
it may be regarded at the same time as a principle of domination that justifies 
power, and as a principle of emancipation from what is perceived as an external or 
illegitimate authority.
This threefold nature gives way to three aporia: sovereignty is a principle of order 
and conservatism as well as a principle of contestation; it may justify domination as 
well as emancipation; and it has had an enduring systemic reach while its substantive 
meaning is highly related to the contexts in which sovereignty claims are voiced. It is 
precisely this transformative logic that this paper seeks to expose, in order to provide 
a better understanding of contemporary forms of sovereigntism. We thus propose a 
socio-historical approach of sovereigntist claims, related to the contexts where they 
emerge. To that purpose, part 1 highlights the interactions between the meanings 
of sovereignty and the contexts where they emerge, by constructing a descriptive 
typology of the different categories of sovereigntist claims and their relationships 
with the corresponding international systems. Part 2 analyses the categories of this 
typology by introducing the five major transformations of sovereigntism and their 
respective international dynamics, which resulted in five steps in the history of the 
1  Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty. Four Chapters From Six Books of the Commonwealth (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992 (1576)).
2  Hugo Grotius, On the Law of War and Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012 (1625)).
3  See Robert Jackson, “Sovereignty in World politics: a Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape”, 
in Robert Jackson (ed.), Sovereignty at the Millennium (Oxford: Blackwell Pub., 1999); Robert Jackson, 
Sovereignty: the Evolution of an Idea (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2013).
4 Bertrand Badie, Un monde sans souveraineté (Paris: Fayard, 1999).
5  Bertrand Badie, The Imported State. The Westernization of the Political Order (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000).
6  Elia R.G. Pusterla, The Credibility of Sovereignty. The Political Fiction of a Concept (Berlin: Springer, 2016).
7  Thomas J. Biersteker, Cynthia Weber, State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996).
8  Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
9  In spite of its contestation, in practice, by increasingly prominent sovereignty-free actors. See James N. 
Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics. A theory of Change and Continuity (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990).
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international relations. This theoretical argument aims to shed a new light on the 
nature of the sovereigntist claims of contemporary emerging countries, addressed in 
part 3. While the sovereigntism of emerging countries is commonly regarded as the 
comeback of a conservative approach to international relations, we argue that neo-
sovereigntism actually proceeds from the very evolution of the international system 
and contributes to its transformation. We are indeed witnessing a triple split of the 
concept of sovereignty and its political uses, reflecting the disconnection between 
the permanence of sovereign equality as a norm, the evolving distribution of power 
and autonomy in the system, and an institutional architecture which perpetuates 
the privileged statuses of a limited number of actors. As a result of this evolution, 
we identify three coexisting categories of sovereignitist claims: neo-sovereigntism, 
archeo-sovereigntism and conservative sovereigntism10. Their encounter, we argue, 
contributes to fuel current international disorders.
SOVEREIGNTY AS A DYNAMIC CONCEPT AND  
A CONTEXT-RELATED CLAIM
While sovereignty is generally regarded as the basic feature and the cornerstone 
of the modern international system, it is also the reference of a political claim 
(sovereigntism). Sovereigntism refers to a claim for emancipation which directly 
proceeds from its author’s perception of the configuration of power in the international 
system. In this perspective, the meaning of sovereigntist claims cannot be considered 
without reference to the system from which their authors seek to emancipate. 
Sovereigntism’s substantive nature is thus directly affected by the evolutions of the 
international system and the perceived repartition of power in this system. Arguing 
that sovereigntist claims are context-related means, for instance, that their substantive 
meaning has varied from the bipolar context to the contemporary period, despite the 
continuous reference to the same concept and its apparently enduring systemic reach.
The impact of international contexts (whether systemic, historical or normative) 
on international politics has been underlined by Gary Goertz. In addition to their 
rather classically observed causational or obstructive effects, he developed the idea 
that contexts may weigh on the meaning of the terms that qualify international 
behaviour and formalise categories of relationships within the system11. In the 
same line, we argue that sovereignty’s substantive meaning is directly related 
to the characteristics of its systemic context. Indeed, while the hypothesis that 
sovereignty is the expression of a claim for emancipation is trans-historical, the 
forms of domination from which actors seek to emancipate evolve in relation to 
their respective perceptions of the system’s configuration. Hence, the transformative 
10  The “new sovreigntism” discussed by Peter J. Spiro in a 2000 article, referring to US politicians and scholars’ 
reluctant approach to international regimes (with the exception of free-trade agreements) and their attempt 
at preserving “American impermeability” from global requirements, would correspond to what is referred 
to as “conservative sovereigntism” in the present typology. See Peter J. Spiro, ‘The New Sovereigntists: 
American Exceptionalism and Its False Prophets’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 6 (2000). (available: https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2000-11-01/new-sovereigntists-american-exceptionalism-and-
its-false-prophets) (accessed  9 March 2016).
11  Gary Goertz, Contexts of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 25 et 
passim.
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meaning of sovereignty and sovereigntism cannot be fully grasped without a socio-
historical analysis of the evolution of its contexts of expression. When sovereignty 
was affirmed by 14th century France, for instance, it was the expression of King 
Philippe IV Le Bel’s claim for emancipation from Papal and imperial authority12. 
In the XXth century, by contrast, anti-colonial leaders claimed sovereignty as a 
justification for their emancipation from colonial Powers.
When one given denotation of a sovereigntist claim becomes systemic13, it 
exerts feedback that contributes, along with other contextual factors, to re-shape 
the system’s configuration14. Sovereigntim thus acts as a dependent variable 
which proceeds from the respective systemic configuration, but it also provokes 
feedback which contributes to the transformation of the system. It is for instance the 
integration of sovereigntist claims by colonised nations (understood as their demand 
for emancipation from colonial domination) that resulted in the construction of a 
post-colonial system based on the (failed) universalisation of the nation-state model 
and sovereign equality.
These feedback mechanisms inform us of the evolution of the international 
system. They shed light on the re-composition of sovereignty’s substantive meaning 
and, at the heart of this study, on the transformation of the conditions and objects of 
sovereigntist claims. While we do not intend to claim that sovereigntist claims are 
a sufficient variable to explain all the transformations of international system, we 
argue that they should be considered as a noteworthy intervening variable. It should 
also be noted that the subsequent developments introduce a necessarily simplified 
vision of historical realities and should not confuse the reader in excluding the 
possibility of a superposition between different types of international systems, 
different denotations of sovereignty and different motivations for sovereigntism. Yet, 
we chose to distinguish five major sequences after the emergence of the Westphalian 
system, corresponding to five stages in the evolution of the international context and 
the corresponding emancipation claims. While these sequences and their succession 
are developed in part 2, it is important to underline some specificities characterising 
the contemporary period.
The international system has reached an unprecedented level of institutionalisation 
(through the tangible institutional architecture expanded with the UN after the 
Second World War, the reinforcement of international law and some innovations 
in its normative orientation, such as the responsibility to protect notion). This 
institutionalisation had the effect of comforting the ruling principles of the 
international architecture and the hierarchy which is reinforced by the dominant 
understanding of sovereignty15. But it has not prevented the international system and 
the distribution of capabilities to evolve in practice, under the combined effects of 
technological, social and economic transformations, stimulating the emergence of 
increasingly relevant actors – either emerging states or so-called sovereignty-free 
12  The claim was voiced as a demand for “summa superioritas”, the supreme authority which provides the kings 
with superiority over regalian powers. See Georges Minois, Philippe le Bel (Paris: Perrin, 2014).
13  Discussions on the different evolutionary paths followed by social structures and historical or juridical 
semantics, as well as their interactions, can be found in Niklas Luhmann, Gesellschaftssrtruktur und Semantik : 
Studien zur Wissenssoziologie der Modernen Gesellschaft (Frankfurt a. M. : Suhrkamp, 1980). 
14 David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965).
15  Richard H. Cooper, Juliette Voïnov Kohler, Responsibility to Protect, The Global Moral Compact for the 21st 
Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
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actors16 (transnational firms, identity entrepreneurs or other aggregated individuals). 
This situation has given way to the unprecedented coexistence of three systems: 
sovereign equality remains affirmed as a norm, the institutionalised international 
architecture preserves the preeminent status of previously established Powers, and 
globalisation de facto provides a more significant role and autonomy to actors that 
were previously considered irrelevant.
There have been past occurrences of disconnection between the institutional 
architecture and the systemic context, most notably during the Cold War. Yet, the 
contemporary situation is unique as it is characterised by the superposition – and 
the claim for domination – of three conflicting conceptions of sovereigntism, whose 
ramifications are developed in part 3. First, ‘new’ actors (emerging countries, 
along with civil societies and other sovereignty-free actors) have acquired enough 
momentum to claim emancipation from an institutional architecture that falls short 
of reflecting their perceived systemic role. Second, previously established Powers 
aim to preserve this institutional architecture, in spite of its increasingly patent 
disconnection from the globalised system, as it is their only way of preserving 
their status. Third, actors who perceive their identity as being immutable and 
consubstantial with their position in the system, feeling threatened in their essence 
by globalisation’s transnational dynamics, seek to retreat from the dynamics of 
globalisation and radically oppose them. The contemporary international system is 
thus characterised by the growing disjunction between three irreconcilable types of 
sovereigntist claims, referred to as ‘neo-sovereigntism’, ‘conservative sovereigntism’ 
and ‘archeo-sovereigntism’ in the subsequent development. 
TRANSFORMATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY
Let us go back to the concept of sovereignty. It is affected by a strong and decisive 
contradiction, as it is really the corner-stone of the main models of international 
order while at the same time being an unstable notion which is constantly varying 
and changing in its meaning. The contradiction can be easily explained. Sovereignty 
is conceived against a potential domination, whereas the domination patterns are 
not lasting and change in their nature according to the issues of the moment. The 
sovereignty paradigm is not stable because the international arena is perpetually 
changing, because its application to the domestic order is changing, because the main 
international issues are also in permanent transformation. Sovereignty is much more 
a ‘cloud’ than a ‘clock’, that is to say it must be considered, according to Popper’s 
categories, as an elusive substance, rather than a fixed and permanent mechanism17.
We may thus discriminate between five incarnations of the sovereignty concept in 
modern history – the Westphalian moment, the national-Westphalian sequence, the 
colonial time, the bipolar context and the post-bipolar era. Each of them matches a 
specific issue which is providing a particular meaning to the concept, while shaping 
different sovereigntist claims. Obviously, these moments are not clearly separated, 
and their succession was messy, contradictory, turbulent, resulting in periods of 
16 Rosenau, op. cit.
17  Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972).
European Review of International Studies, Volume 3/201610
overlapping, or even steps backward. We present them as an hypothesis which sheds 
light on the effect played by the changing context on the substance of the concept.
International Sequences of Sovereignty
A broad conception of the ‘Westphalian moment’ covers the state-building process 
in Western Europe and corresponds to the first stabilisation of the concept of 
sovereignty. The Westphalian peace was concluded in 1648, but its premises trace 
back to the end of the Middle Ages when the state was constructed as a way of 
emancipation from the imperial and the pontifical domination. Before generating an 
institutional order, sovereignty was then conceived as a claim, a kind of rebellion, 
or a protest against an established political order dominated by the Empire and the 
Church. When he mentioned sovereignty, French king Philippe IV was striking 
up a war cry against the Pope or the Emperor rather than thinking about a new 
international order18. Claims and demands were structuring the international arena 
much more than institutions. The resilience of this first conception of sovereignty 
is particularly remarkable, as it reappears at any moment of the international 
history, and even still now among the Palestinian or Kurd peoples. This protest, 
oriented towards the main classical attributes of sovereignty, has generated the first 
sovereign institutions, such as territoriality (fixing the horizons of an emancipative 
orientation), jus plenum (a description of the new competence of the sovereign 
power), differentiation (in the form of secularism against the Pope, or pre-national 
and anti-imperial against the Emperor). This institutional achievement appears as 
the culmination and the materialisation of this first sequence. Sanctioned by Jean 
Bodin’s famous definition of sovereignty as an ultimate power19, it led to Grotius’20 
and then Hobbes’ conceptualisation21.
The ‘national Westphalian moment’ is quite different, as it is more related to 
domestic than international features. It addresses the birth of a national or even 
popular sovereignty, as it appears at the beginning of the democratisation process, 
during the nineteenth century. Obviously, sovereignty was still a claim, but oriented 
at this time against a domestic opponent. The target was then the absolutist state and 
legitimism, and its frame was to be found in the nation in process of being created. 
But in the meantime, international relations were substantially modified. The map 
of the world was no longer based on state territories but on national territories and 
the self-determination principle got the major role as an international dynamic. 
Moreover, national cohesiveness became an important resource in the international 
competition. War was no longer an inter-state competition but an inter-national 
rivalry. Jus plenum is then less relevant than national will as an achievement of this 
new order.
The ‘colonial time’ opens a new way. The target is no longer a simple hegemon, 
nor an absolutist rule. It is a combination of the two, and added to the ‘civilisation 
18  Joseph Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973).
19 Bodin, op. cit.
20 Grotius , op. cit.
21  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, 
ed. by Ian Shapiro (New Haven: Yale University Press 2010 (1651)).
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standards’. In other words, sovereignty was then challenging an international order 
based on an inequality of cultures and civilisations. Henceforth sovereignty is 
conceived as an unstable balance between the re-appropriation of the Western state 
model and a cultural contesting self-assertion. Pan-Asiatic conferences took place in 
Japan and thereafter in India just after the First World War, while the first pan-African 
conferences were held during the colonial exhibition in Paris, in 1900. In 1926, the 
first pan-Islamic conference was hosted by Al-Azhar University in Cairo, just before 
a second one was held in Mecca and a third one in Jerusalem. The sovereign claim 
was then based on challenging the colonial order and mobilising the principle of a 
people’s right to self-determination.
For these reasons, this third step once again somewhat blurred the traditional 
international game. On one hand, the self-determination process was separated from 
the territorial principle, despite the influence of international law and international 
institutions. Closely related to self-determination, sovereignty was then mobilised 
by many political and cultural entrepreneurs to legitimate separatist movements 
and to entail a real secessionist process, as it took place in Katanga, Biafra, South-
Sudan, Somaliland or elsewhere. Mixing cultural considerations and sovereignty 
achievement, the process often resulted in deadlock, such as with the Kurd or Tamil 
separatists’ claims. On the other hand, the sovereignty principle changed drastically 
by leaving its political specificity and merging its original political dimension 
with cultural references. Non-Western sovereigntisms are tainted with culturalism, 
paving the way to an endless competition between secular nationalist leaders and 
fundamentalist entrepreneurs.
The ‘bipolar context’ shifted the lines. Sovereignty was then closely associated 
with power and had to be defined in view of the super-Power hegemony. In this 
new perspective, sovereignty acquired two new meanings. First, it was closely 
associated with power and was appreciated according to the ability of a state to 
acquire or maintain its ‘status’ in a world which was clearly dominated by the two 
super-Power condominium. At the time, the concept of ‘limited sovereignty’ was 
taking shape in the diplomatic language while sovereignty was no longer based on 
a legal recognition but on a power capacity22. But the concept acquired a second 
meaning, by referring to some players’ reluctance to take part in the bipolar game 
and to lose their identity through alignment with one camp or the other. Sovereignty 
was then underlining an opposition between a lasting alliance, which would contain 
sovereignty, and symmachy, which rather refers to fighting a common enemy jointly 
without prejudice to the duration and the intensity of the alliance. Sovereigntist 
claims then referred to self-affirmation or even anti-imperialist foreign policies, and 
they appear first of all as a reluctance to participate in the bipolar system.
This reluctance can be observed in some allies’ free rider strategy (France under 
Charles de Gaulle’s leadership, China with Mao Zedong, Yugoslavia with Tito or 
Romania with Nicolae Ceaușescu). This posture was mainly expressed through 
the concept of ‘national independence’ and appeared as a ‘restored sovereignty’, 
picturing sovereignty as a status which is supposed to be protected. The same 
orientation can be found among a rising ‘Third World’ which emerged following 
decolonisation and strove to escape a new kind of submission. The Bandung 
22  Christopher Daase et al., Recognition in International Relations (London, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2015).
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conference is an iconic expression of this mobilisation that shaped this new vision 
of sovereignty as protection against power and alignment, as it was clearly claimed 
by the Indian Prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru. This tradition was consolidated 
through the Non-Aligned Movement, opened by the Brioni Declaration on 19 July 
1956, which brought together Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser and Tito who shared the same 
reverence for sovereignty. The presence of the Yugoslavian leader bridged the Third 
World arena and the reluctant allies of the bipolarised camps.
The ‘post-bipolar era’ finally broke with an outdated construction: as sovereignty 
can no longer be defined as a way of containing a hegemony which does not work 
any more, it is now conceived through the autonomy expected by the middle Powers 
which have henceforth emancipated from the super-Power control. Among rising 
Powers, the new context paved the way for achieving their own autonomy while 
the fighting states are increasingly autonomous in running the conflicts in which 
they are involved. The “reluctant sheriffs”23 are less and less capable of monitoring 
international conflicts taking place at its periphery. The United States fails in 
pressuring Israeli governments to ease the colonisation process, while Russia’s 
ability to control the pro-Russian Ukrainian fighters or the government of Damascus 
has decreased. 
Moreover, the globalisation process is strongly challenging the hard core of the 
concept of sovereignty by promoting a world of interdependence in the economic, 
political and cultural realms24. In this trend, globalisation triggers an archeo-
sovereigntist claim, depicted as a populist anti-globalisation protest, a conservative 
sovereigntism, which seeks to maintain as such the institutionalised inter-State 
system, as well as a neo-sovereigntism which strives to promote a new kind of 
autonomy in a competitive world.
Sovereigntisms’ Feedback Effects on International Systems
These five configurations have respectively exerted a strong feedback on the 
international system and contributed to shape their successive configurations. 
Sovereignty must be considered here in the two faces of a dependent variable and 
of an independent variable. The Westphalian conception of sovereignty has fuelled 
an inter-state system, given a new meaning to the principle of territoriality and 
established war as the structuring dynamic of the international arena. As states 
are defined as sovereign units, they are considered free of any rule in their own 
competition and, as a result, fighting states are perceived as the normal conditions 
of the international game. As Charles Tilly points out, war-making and state-making 
are naturally merging25. In the same perspective, the Westphalian conception 
paved the way for the elaboration of an international public law which grew up 
as a sovereigntist law, introducing in it a founding contradiction in that states are 
23  Richard N. Haass, The Reluctant Sheriff. The United States after the Cold War (New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations Press, 1997).
24  Jan Aart Scholte, Globalisation. A Critical Approach (London, New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2000).
25  Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, 
Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 169–
187.
Delphine Alles/Bertrand Badie: Sovereigntism in the International System 13
committed to the implementation of international law… but in a sovereign manner, 
which makes it inevitably unachieved. This contradiction, furthermore, split the 
new European culture into two streams: one, inspired by Thomas Hobbes26, which 
made sovereignty absolute, by that devaluing international law, as is the case in the 
American political culture. The second, inspired by Grotius27, reassessed the role 
of the law for granting peace and trade, and paved the way to multilateralism. This 
lasting tension is probably the direct result of the complexity of the first model.
The ‘national Westphalian model’ substituted an inter-national for an inter-state 
system. The self-determination principle introduced peoples and societies in a game 
which was previously an inter-dynastic game. Two main impacts should be considered. 
The international competition then drew its legitimacy not from the ‘raison d’Etat’, 
but from a national will, according to a rule which strongly weakened the political 
instrumentality of sovereignty. Instead of being a means of international competition, 
sovereignty became an end in itself. Indeed, sovereignty did not relate any more to 
territoriality but to nations, marking a significant milestone in the decolonisation 
process. The sovereignty principle, which was invented as an asset for consolidating 
the international role of the prince, was suddenly in a situation of weakness in the 
international arena by becoming the instrument of peoples and societies28. In the 
meantime, the national Westphalian model destabilised the European map and 
opened the way to an instability fuelled by the permanent contradiction between 
national sovereignty and territoriality29.
The ‘colonial moment’ went further in this direction. It created a falsely 
universalised world, by introducing the territoriality principle in Africa and Asia 
and by extracting it from its own history. It thus gave rise to an ambiguous relation 
between nation and ethnicity. It also tinkered with a new conception of sovereignty 
which aimed to legitimise colonial domination. The General Act of the Berlin 
Conference on the European colonisation of Africa (26 February 1885) referred 
to the “‘sovereignty rights’ of European powers on African territories” (art 5, 6, 
7, 8) and endorsed its first Westphalian meaning right at a time when the national 
Westphalian model was taking shape. This strong contradiction initiated the anti-
colonial mobilisation whilst mixing imitation of the Westphalian model in the 
state building project and the use of the national Westphalian model as a matrix of 
protest30. This risky combination later fuelled a proliferation of failed states among 
the newly independent states.
The ‘Cold War model’ significantly reconciled sovereignty and power, while 
granting a special importance to camp and bloc policy. This regression of national 
sovereignty particularly affected middle Powers since their level of power was not 
high enough for pretending to a real sovereignty. Germany and Japan were the main 
victims of this new context, in spite of their growing economic capacity. France and 
the United Kingdom opted for two opposite strategies. The former chose to promote 
a policy of ‘grandeur’ driven by General de Gaulle, mixing influence and national 
independence. The latter opted for a status of privileged ally, in order to recover a 
26 Hobbes, op. cit.
27 Grotius, op. cit.
28  Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People, Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of 
California Press, 1978).
29 Bertrand Badie, La Fin des territoires (Paris : Fayard, 1995).
30 Badie, The Imported State, op. cit.
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minimal level of power and momentarily regain a part of its sovereignty, particularly 
as a nuclear military Power.
The ‘post-bipolar era’ confirms this orientation, as power has lost a part of its 
efficiency when facing the new international issues and new conflicts31. While power 
was previously confiscated by a small number of States (in fact, the two super-
Powers), in this new sequence, power tends to retract on an increasingly limited 
capacity. In this context, status tends to be substituted to sovereignty. Such a shift 
deeply modified the conditions of the new international relations32, while the new 
construction of sovereignty got, as we shall see, a more symbolic dimension.
FEATURES OF THE CONTEMPORARY SPLIT
Since the institutionalisation of the international system, the normative fiction 
of sovereign equality has been hampered in practice by the perpetuation of an 
international hierarchy which is reinforced by this system. More recently, however, 
the challenge posed by globalisation to the traditional expressions of power has 
given way to a new context where this hierarchy is increasingly contested. The three 
conflicting features of the contemporary system – normative equality, institutionalised 
hierarchy, globalisation – each produce their own forms of resistance and the 
subsequent types of sovereigntist claims. Due to their unprecedented superposition, 
the post-bipolar context is characterised by the unsettling encounter of three 
conflicting understandings of sovereignty and sovereigntist claims, resulting in a 
chaotic situation.
Characteristics of the New Context
The legal uniformity of the international system, inherited from the post-Second 
World War and post-Colonial period, was reinforced by the end of the bipolar 
system. The quest for national sovereignty and sovereign equality, then understood 
as national self-determination and resulting in anti-colonial claims, led to a global 
expansion of the nation-state model. This process resulted in the transformation of 
political entities, through their alignment on the conventional norm of a sovereign 
and institutionalised nation-state bounded by fixed territorial borders, which is also 
a condition for their international recognition33 and existence. In practice, it also 
provoked a diversification of the forms of political systems commonly labelled as 
sovereign nation-states, opening a first breach on the substantive meaning of this 
notion34.
A noticeable evolution found its roots in the foundation of the United Nations 
and was reinforced after the 1990s, which saw an increasing institutionalisation 
31  Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars. Organised Violence in a Global Era (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2000).
32  Thomas J. Volgy, Renato Corbetta, Keith A. Grant and Ryan G. Baird (eds.), Major Powers and the Quest for 
Status in International Politics (London, New York: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2011).
33  Thomas Lindemann, Erik Ringmar, The International Politics of Recognition (London: Routledge, 2011).
34 Badie, The Imported State, op. cit.
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of the international system. Two increasingly obvious inconsistencies resulted 
from this process. First, a disconnection between the reference to state sovereignty 
and its institutionalised practice, second, a disconnection between the structure 
of domination perpetuated by this institutionalised system and the changing 
international reality. The first disconnection emerged as early as the initial debates 
on external sovereignty and the foundation of international law, which proclaimed 
the principle of sovereign equality among states, while the international reality was 
practically never such. Some states were always ‘more [sovereign] than others’, 
as the systemic organisation reflected variations in the repartition of power rather 
than sovereign equality. Yet, the disconnection between the sovereign fiction and 
its less-than-perfect reality was never as manifest as with the foundation of global 
institutions. Indeed, the latter proclaimed and engraved in the stone of international 
conventions the previously implicit aim of regulating international relations based on 
the principle of sovereignty. Meanwhile, it also institutionalised the domination of 
the most powerful actors. The disconnection is quite obvious between the proclaimed 
principle (implemented in the principle of equal representation and vote at the UN 
General Assembly) and its institutionalised limitation (illustrated by the right of veto 
of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council). This contradiction has 
been justified on practical or political grounds35, yet, it introduces a strong case for 
the objection of actors who consider this institutionalised domination as illegitimate 
and contrary to the definition of sovereign equality. Contention has been particularly 
vocal since the actors benefiting from this institutionalised dominant position have 
attempted to impose a normative conception of sovereignty, thus associated to a 
‘responsibility’ understood as respect for a number of norms that are in line with 
their own political systems and their respective definitions of the role of international 
institutions, such as with the notion of ‘Responsibility to protect’. It is not surprising 
that this discrepancy between norms and practice fostered remonstration. Yet, the 
emergence of a significant opposition had to wait for potential contesters to gain 
enough momentum.
The transformative factor was the erosion of traditional forms of power and 
the emergence of new (state and non-state) actors in the post-bipolar globalisation. 
This evolution was the necessary condition for the emergence of protest against the 
confiscation of dominant positions by few actors who no longer are unquestionably 
the most prominent players at the world level. In this context of an encounter 
between the global or multi-centric world and the traditional or interstate system36, 
three phenomena are relevant from the perspective of this article. First, globalisation 
produces its own forms of resistance (formulated as emancipation claims) on the part 
of the state-actors who see it as a threat to their centrality in IR and seek to sustain the 
traditional system. Such resistance creates a tension around the notion of sovereignty, 
which is thus constructed by these actors as not only the conventional founding 
principle of the international system, but also as an end to achieve in international 
politics37. Second, the transformations provoked by globalisation and the evolution 
35  Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate, Kelly-Kate Pease, The United Nations and Changing 
World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2014) ; Thomas G. Weiss, “The Veto: Problems and Prospects”, 
e-International Relations (27 March 2014, available: http://www.e-ir.info/2014/03/27/the-veto-problems-and-
prospects/) (accessed 8 March 2016). 
36 Rosenau, op. cit.
37  This phenomenon also appears in the notion of ‘responsibility to protect’, which subordinates sovereignty to 
the implementation of international norms.
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of the global economy facilitate the emergence of new actors. The latter are enabled 
and legitimated in their questioning of an international architecture which not only 
contradicts the sovereignty principle, but which also no longer reflects an accurate 
hierarchy of power in international relations. The gap is thus twofold: between the 
norm and the institutional architecture that claims to implement it, and between this 
existing architecture and the reality it initially institutionalised.
It is thus the encounter of three dimensions of the contemporary international 
context, and the actors they frustrate, that produce three different and coexisting 
types of sovereigntism (see Table 1). These three dimensions are the norms on 
which the international architecture claims to be based (the institutionalised fiction 
of sovereign equality), the reality of the institutionalised international architecture 
(a privileged position for actors who dominated this institutionalisation process) and 
the transformative effects of globalisation (the emergence of new actors contesting 
the institutionalised hierarchy).
Three Types of Sovereigntism
‘Conservative sovereigntism’ is in the line of the Westphalian vision, completed 
with more than a sprinkle of the former colonial conception. As the main instance, 
Western foreign policies refer to a traditional conception of a state-centred world in 
which every unit is claiming the right ultimately to make their own decisions. In the 
meantime, old Powers are keen to consider that they have ‘special responsibilities’ 
to intervene in the domestic affairs of some other members of the international 
community. These special responsibilities may be based on different principles, 
either on the ‘meta-sovereigntism’ implied by the collective security doctrine, or 
on a post-colonial vision granting special rights to some states which are actually 
constituting an oligarchy or a club. They may then implement what is presented 
as a ‘mission’ to fight against evil (as exposed in neo-conservative discourses) or 
consider themselves to be committed to historical references or responsibilities, as 
France did when intervening in Mali or in the CAR, as well as Russia in the Ukraine. 
In this conservative conception, globalisation should remain confined to being an 
exclusively economic phenomenon without any political relevance in inter-state 
relationships.
Facing this conservatism, a ‘neo-sovereigntism’ emerged, especially among rising 
Powers, relying on the new profile of the globalised world. This neo-sovereigntism 
is clearly pre-empted by the interests and values of states coming from a dominated 
status and now pretending to play a major role in the new global order. According 
to this orientation, neo-sovereigntism can be described through six specific features: 
self-affirmation, self-protection, new mutualism, anti-hierarchy assertion, protest 
and flexible norms.
Self-affirmation appears as a coming back to the historical origins of sovereignty. 
All the rising Powers have to reconquer their sovereignty after a colonial or a para-
colonial moment, made of capitulations, territorial concessions or tutorship. This 
national affirmation is more affective and emotional than competitive. It is generally 
built on a humiliation of memory, such as China’s mobilisation of centuries of 
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humiliation38 and its informal ‘National Humiliation Day’ which might be considered 
as a prominent assertion of its sovereignty.
Self-protection refers to a foreign policy that is based on the principle of 
territorial integrity, rather than an extensive global diplomacy. China is much more 
concerned with the respect of what its leaders consider as its own borderlines than 
prompt to get involved in the various conflicts which take place anywhere around the 
world. The ‘non-acting’ principle (Wuwei) even appears as one of the cornerstones 
of the Chinese foreign policy. More globally, the principle of non-interference in 
national affairs is considered as a basis of the new international order, as is regularly 
claimed by the Chinese, Indian, South African or Brazilian diplomacies39. Such a 
permanent assertion results in a strong reluctance to external (even multilateral) 
military interventions as a way of regime change or even of conflict-solving or 
war containment. Brazil, China and India abstained when the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1973, which opened the way to a multilateral intervention in 
Libya. South Africa only approved it under pressure from the African Union. Brazil 
and China abstained when Resolutions 940, 944, 948 and 964 SCR passed in 1994, 
although it aimed to restore Haitian progressive leader Jean-Bertrand Aristide. 
When Beijing approved Resolution 794 on Somalia, its representative argued that, 
as no government was ruling this failed state, no sovereignty was in position to 
be violated40… In this ‘self-protection’ policy, the rising Powers are particularly 
sceptical of the ‘responsibility to protect’ principle (R2P). They strove to limit its 
pretentions during the 60th anniversary summit, while Brazilian foreign minister 
Antonio Patriota suggested amending it by promoting the idea of a “responsibility 
‘while’ protecting”41. A Turkish scholar, Mojtaba Mahdavi, also coined the concept 
of “responsibility for justice” (R4J) which puts R2P in a post-colonial perspective42.
New mutualism fuels a significant solidarity among rising Powers: neo-
sovereigntism does not imply any isolationism or a ‘closed foreign policy’. Instead 
of the competitive sovereignty which clearly sprang from the Westphalian model, 
this new model considers a strong cooperation among states which are standing at 
roughly equivalent levels of development and sharing similar histories. We can for 
instance observe a clear trend in former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Da Silva 
(Lula)’s diplomacy to promote cooperation among ‘Southern countries’, solidarity 
with the Arab word celebrated by frequent Summits between South American and 
Middle East leaders, or with African countries, as well as meetings of China and 
African countries. In the meantime, rising Powers promote cooperative associations, 
such as IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, South 
Africa) in order to voice common visions and policies on major international issues.
38  Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and Power. China’s Long March to the Twenty-First Century (New 
York: Random House, 2013).
39  Sean W. Burges, Brazilian Foreign Policy After the Cold War (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 
2011); David M. Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011).
40  Frédéric Ramel, “794 (1992) : Somalie”, in Mélanie Albaret, Emmanuel Decaux, Nicolas Lemay-Hebert 
and Delphine Placidi-Frot (eds.), Les Grandes Résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies (Paris : 
Dalloz, 2012), pp. 170–180.
41  Derek McDougall, “Responsibility While Protecting. Brazil’s Proposal for Modifying Responsibility to 
Protect”, in Global Responsibility to Protect, Vol. 6, No. 1 (2014), pp. 64–87.
42  Mahdavi Mojtaba, ‘A Post-Colonial Critique of Responsibility to Protect in the Middle East’, Perceptions, Vol. 
XX, No. 1 (2015), p. 28.
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The anti-hierarchy orientation should be considered as another legacy of the 
past. Sovereignty was shaped in Europe as emancipation from the Empire, but also 
as the source of an equal competition among states. Neo-sovereigntism is, on the 
contrary, a new way for claiming the right to compete with traditional Powers which 
considered themselves as forming a club of rulers. With the exception of China, all 
the rising Powers question the composition of the UN Security Council, and all of 
them have had harsh words against the G8 (or G7) and the various contact groups 
which are constituted around the main Western Powers for dealing with major 
international crises. New sovereigntism is thus less connected to power and more 
related to autonomy.
For the same reason, neo-sovereigntism is blended with protest and goes back 
to the origin of the concept, stressing its emancipative dimension which tinges it 
with some marks of populism, as with Hugo Chavez’ 2006 discourse against the 
United States, denouncing “the sulfuric smell” which he claimed George W. Bush 
had left at the UN tribune… In a broader sense, this sovereigntism has a ‘tribunician’ 
orientation as it pretends to use the rising Powers’ voice in order to make barely 
audible the recriminations brought by marginal and less developed states.
Finally, neo-sovereigntism is locked within a strong contradiction. On the 
one hand, it expects firm rules for containing old Powers and strengthening the 
sovereignty rights, on the other hand, it advocates soft and flexible norms in order 
to protect the independence of every member of the international community. This 
complex vision commonly bears on international negotiations and complicates the 
integration of rising Powers into new international conventions.
‘Archeo-sovereigntism’ differs from both the conservative and the neo visions. 
It is much more radical than the former, and, contrary to the latter, it is strongly 
oriented against globalisation. The conservative version of sovereigntism aims 
to maintain its rule on the world, while archeo-sovereigntism plans to contest its 
globalised orientation and is well received as an emblem by all those suffering from 
the transformations of the world. Archeo-sovereigntism then fuels European far right 
parties’ discourses, such as the Front national in France, the Lega Nord in Italy, 
the Dansk Folk Party in Denmark, some civil society movements like Pegida in 
Germany, and it also inspires the postures of some European governments as in 
the case of Hungary or Poland. It pleads for a retreat of nations into their borders 
and claims the sovereignty principle as the main pretext for turning away migrant 
people. It crosses the line into xenophobia, sometimes antisemitism or islamophobia, 
strategically basing sovereignty on identity or even on ethnicity.






Approach of  
globalisation
Neo-sovereigntism Self-affirmation Equality Hierarchy Pragmatic
Archeo- 
sovereigntism




Emergence of  
challengers
Selective
Delphine Alles/Bertrand Badie: Sovereigntism in the International System 19
Encounter between Three Types of Sovereigntism
The main question now is to consider how these different meanings of sovereignty 
can coexist and interplay on the international arena. Obviously, international 
relations have never before been affected by such a discrepancy of meanings among 
their agents when referring to the very concept that is ruling the game. This is due 
to an impressive accumulation effect, through which such different meanings were 
blended over time. This ambiguity is particularly strong when we consider the ‘new 
international conflicts’. In the Ukraine, Western Powers, Russia and pro-Russian 
militias do not refer to the same conception of sovereignty. The contrast is much 
more impressive when we take into account the Syrian conflict, in which actors 
coexist who give different meanings to the same concept and one of them, ISIS 
(Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) officially rejects the concept whilst using some of its 
material attributes (territory, administration, army, currency or taxes).
In such a context, sovereignty is clearly losing its regulation capacity in the 
international game. Steven Krasner has pointed to four attributes which enabled 
this ‘organised hypocrisy’ to serve as a common rule43. None of them is currently 
operational as they are from now on either partly rejected or refer to different 
meanings. As previously mentioned, the Westphalian conception of sovereignty, 
which was supposed to contain any kind of external interference, is interpreted, 
and even understood, differently by the players. The international legal sovereignty 
is commonly challenged by the increasing number of non-state actors and failed 
states, while traditional states and rising Powers do not give them the same meaning. 
Domestic sovereignty is undermined by the growing role of ethnicity, militia, 
warlords and violence entrepreneurs, and interdependent sovereignty is collapsing 
due to the increasing autonomy and capacity of intra-state movements.
For these reasons, the sovereignty principle is less and less considered as a rule. 
Meanwhile, we are going back to its origins and rediscovering it as a way offered 
to the actors for redefining their own status in an international arena in transition. 
Sovereignty is then more a protest than the basis of real institutions, whatever 
the substance of this protest is (against deviances and protests with conservative 
sovereigntism, against a changing world and its changing rules with archeo-
sovereigntism, against the institutionalised hierarchy with neo-sovereigntism). When 
interplaying, these three kinds of claims lose an increasing part of their legitimacy 
and are increasingly considered as the ‘evil of the other’. Worse, the diversification 
of sovereignty’s meanings is highly conflictual as it enables actors pertaining to each 
category to oppose, through their respective conception of sovereignty, what the 
others define as the core of their own sovereigntist claim. 
43 Krasner, op. cit.
